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  ABSTRACT:  Recent developments, such as privatization and the private finance 
initiative, have raised the issue of which assets should be owned by the public sector and 
whether assets have different values in the public and private sector. In order to answer to this 
question we make here a parallel between public and private investment under considerations 
such investment appraisal, valuation criteria, cost of capital and the required rate of return , as 
well as the risk associated to public-sector investments. Finally we offer an example that 
highlights some of the considerations presented below. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The governments are responsible for setting macroeconomic policy. They seek 
to promote equity by aiding the poor and the disadvantaged and they provide a variety 
of services- education, health, defense, infrastructure, police and postal services. Most 
of these activities involve large investments. 
  One of the problems raised in public and private investment’s appraisal is the 
value of the assets. If the assets have different values in the public and private sector 
which assets should be owned by the public sector and how to price assets that are 
transferred between the two sectors? In fact, investment appraisal in public sector 
should differ from that in the private sector? In this paper we try to answer to that 
question. 
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2. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
 
  The managers of firms in private sector will maximize the welfare of 
shareholders by undertaking all projects that increase shareholder wealth. A project’s 
contribution to shareholder wealth, named its net present value (NPV), is calculated by 
discounting the project expected cash flows by the return expected on capital market 
securities of equivalent risk. Irrespective of the model used for estimating the expected 
return, investors require a premium for bearing risk. This risk premium takes the form 
of a higher required return and depends on the project’s non-diversifiable (or factor) 
risk. Managers can best help shareholders by accepting all projects with positive NPV. 
  Both public and private sectors undertake projects that require making some 
initial investments and are expected to provide benefits over a number of years. 
  Both sectors must choose between making these investments and returning the 
cash to be invested to their beneficiaries (the shareholder in the case of private-sector 
firms and the citizenry in the case of governments) who can then invest the cash 
directly in the capital markets or spend it on current consumption. All parties involved 
(firms, government, shareholders, citizenry) have access to the same capital markets, 
so the opportunity cost of these investments should be the same for both sectors. 
  In neither case can the beneficiaries’ wishes be ignored with impunity. 
Directors can replace managers if they prove to be incompetent, or run the risk of 
themselves being replaced. Similarly, citizens in a democracy are provided, through 
elections, with the regular opportunity to replace incompetent governments. They also 
elect representatives whose role is to monitor the government. 
  At first sight, one might expect the investment criteria that are appropriate for 
private sector firms to be fairly similar to those for government. That this need not lead 
to the same investment appraisal procedures is a consequence of the different nature of 
the agency relationships in the public and private sectors and of the differing intent of 
the contemplated investments as well as the presence of distortions such as taxes. 
 
3.VALUATION CRITERIA FOR PUBLIC-SECTOR INVESTMENTS 
 
  These criteria cannot be identical to those for private-sector. The only cases 
where government assets should have the same value as their private-sector equivalents 
are those where there are no public goods, no monopolies and no externalities. These 
are the cases in which there no motive for public ownership. 
  Despite the assumption of a difference between public and private-sector 
valuations, there are important dimensions along which valuation techniques should be 
the same in both sectors. Differential agency effects, public goods, monopolies and 
externalities affect only the cash flows of a project. As we shall see, the cost of capital 
is the same in the public and private sector in the absence of tax distortions and with 
complete capital markets. Under these conditions, a given set of future cash flows with 
particular level of risk should be evaluated in the same way in the public and in the 
private sector. So we have to analyze the imperfections, such as taxes, that drive a 
wedge between the opportunity cost of capital in the public and private sector.  
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  First, we have to consider the issue of unanimity among shareholders and 
citizen. The cost and benefits of a firm’s investment decisions are shared 
proportionately by the firm’s shareholders, who are therefore largely united in their 
objectives. Such proportional sharing is generally not true of public sector investments. 
Government investments may be motivated by externalities, which affect different 
segments of the population in different degrees. A rule that requires the government to 
make only Pareto improving investments (investments that make at least someone 
better off and no one worse off) is clearly too restrictive for practical use. An 
alternative rule (Hicks, 1940; Kaldor, 1939) would require the government to value all 
the benefits and costs of proposed investments and make those investments that offer 
the largest net benefits. 
Under this criterion, project should be undertaken by the government if those 
who benefit from the project can afford to compensate those who suffer (those who 
bear the direct costs of the investment or are exposed to its negative externalities. If 
such compensation may not always be paid, the government needs to recognize the 
distributional effects of the investments it makes. This may be achieved by postulating 
a social welfare function that summarizes the relative merits of alternative income 
distributions, but it is unclear how such a function should be determined. Moreover, it 
would be suboptimal to take distributional considerations into account on a project-by-
project basis. Thus, it is common simply to calculate the net benefits of an investment 
and to make separate judgement as to its distributional consequences. 
 
4. THE COST OF CAPITAL IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
  The defining characteristic of investment decisions is their concern with 
benefits and costs that are not coincident. Costs are generally incurred at the outset, 
whereas benefits may be delayed. Future benefits and costs must be discounted to the 
present, so an important problem in public finance is the determination of the 
appropriate discount rate or cost of capital and its comparison with that used by private 
sector firms. 
  In the following considerations we first abstract from risk and taxes. 
The opportunity cost to the government of investing in risk-free real assets is 
the reduction in interest payments that it would achieve if the cash to be invested were 
instead used to repurchase government debt. Since similar opportunities are open to 
private-sector firms, the rate of interest on government debt is the opportunity cost of 
capital for a risk-free investment by both the private and public sectors. The discount 
rate used by the government, the social rate of time preference or social discount rate 
should differ from the market rate of interest (Pearce and Nash, 1981) and  conceptual 
distinction between the market rate of interest and the social discount rate: 
I.  Resource expenditure by government has an opportunity cost, because 
the resources would otherwise be available for other uses, to provide 
immediate consumption benefits and be at least partly invested to 
produce a return. There is a further cost of the distortions caused by 
taxation, at the margin, to fund increments in public expenditures.  
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II.  These opportunity costs apply equally to extra expenditure and to 
expenditure savings, and in general, apply as much to later as to earlier 
years. They are therefore generally not relevant to the simple 
comparison of public expenditure over time, for which the conceptual 
basis depends on people’s time preference for consumption. 
It is unclear what is the appropriate decision rule if the two rates point to 
different courses of action or how the choice of rate depends on the nature of the flows. 
The difference between the two rates is unlikely to be large enough to justify making a 
practical distinction. 
There may be several motives for wishing to distinguish between the 
opportunity cost of capital and the social discount rate. A benevolent government may 
be justified in encouraging investment for the future and may even want to invest in 
projects that have a lower return than that required by investors. More rationally, 
individuals may fail to consider the welfare of future generations in making their 
consumption and investment decisions. The government, acting as a guardian of future 
generations, should invest at rates of return that individuals acting in their own selfish 
interest would find unacceptable. 
To the extent that involves a value judgement about the sacrifice that one 
generation ought to make on behalf of another, the social rate of time preference 
cannot be a matter for economics analysis. But it is not even clear that, in principle, a 
democratically elected government could or should use any discount rate but the 
market rate of interest to value its investment. 
A government would be justified in using a discount rate that is lower than the 
market rate of interest only when the resources to be invested  by the government 
cannot be invested at the market rate of interest. When these resources can be invested 
at the market rate of interest, whether by the private sector or the public sector, it is 
undesirable to divert them to an investment that will return the lower social discount 
rate. We may stating that the issue of distinguishing between the market rate of interest 
and the social discount rate arises only in the case of a large project in a large 
economy, for such a project may affect the market rate of interest. In the case of a 
small open economy, as are most economies today, resources can always be invested at 
the world market interest rate. As a conclusion, the social discount rate cannot be lower 
than the market interest rate, for it is the latte that represents the opportunity cost of 
any investment. 
 
5. THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF CAPITAL AND THE REQUIRED RATE 
OF RETURN 
 
  In order to make a conceptual distinguish between the social discount rate and 
the opportunity cost of capital, we have to distinguish between the opportunity cost of 
capital and the real required average rate of return (RRR) which is used as the discount 
rate for investment in trading activities. It is difficult to understand this distinction. It is 
true that, if private sector firms undertake only those projects that have positive NPV 
when valued at the cost of capital, the average rate of return will be higher than the cost 
of capital. But private-sector firms do not in consequence change their criterion to one  
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of earning an above-average rate of return. If governments follow a policy of accepting 
only those projects that are expected to earn at least the cost of capital, they will find 
that their average return exceeds the cost of capital. 
 
6. RISK AND THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
  The choice by many governments and multilateral institutions of discount rate 
that are close to the risk free rate suggest that they view the public-sector projects as 
being of low risk. It is not entirely clear, whether this is because governments consider 
the projects undertaken by the public sector as being by nature of low risk or whether it 
is because they consider that projects become of low risk by virtue of being undertaken 
by the public sector. 
  A common but simple case for using a low public-sector discount rate focuses 
on the fact that the government can borrow at the risk-free interest rate. Private-sector 
firms generally borrow at a higher rate of interest than does the government and, must 
service equity made costly by the risk premium that must be paid to shareholders. The 
apparent contrast between cheap debt raised by the government and costly debt and 
equity raised by private-sector firms is misleading. Taxpayers bear the residual risk of 
government investments, particularly those of making good on the obligations to 
debtholders, in much the same way as the shareholders of a private-sector firm. 
  A more sophisticated argument for a low public discount rate has been made 
by Arrow (1965, 1966), Arrow and Lind (1970), Samuelson (1964), Solow (1965). As 
noted by Bailey and Jensen (1972), underlying this argument is the presumption that: 
a) the risk of public-sector projects is distributed over the entire population; b) 
diversifying risks through government ownership can serve to eliminate risk to a very 
large extent, and c) such diversification can be achieved more cheaply by the 
government than by financial markets.. 
  Critics of these risk-pooling arguments are directed against each of the 
argument’s three headings (Bailey and Jensen, 1972). 
a) While it is true that much of the uncertainty about the costs of a government 
project is borne by taxpayers and is widely distributed, the uncertainty about the 
project’s benefits is generally borne by the specific individuals who receive those 
benefits. 
b) Pooling can eliminate risk only if the outcomes of public projects are 
independent both of each other and of outcomes of private investments. While Arrow 
and Lind recognize the former condition, they provide no evidence that it is satisfied.  
c) The assertion that private markets do not constitute an efficient mechanism 
for insuring risk is not justified. 
Perhaps the determining consideration is this (Hirshleifer, 1964; Bailey and 
Jensen, 1972): in the presence of complete capital markets, in which the pay-offs to all 
projects are spanned by existing securities, taxpayers can shed any risk that accrues 
from the undertaking of a project by the government by trading in the capital markets. 
The risk premium demanded by the capital markets is the cost of shedding this risk. It 
is therefore the risk premium demanded for both public- and private-sector projects.  
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  It is well-known that the discount rate should vary with a project’s exposure to 
risk. It is difficult to make fine distinctions regarding project risk, but when assets are 
exchanged between the public and private sectors, spurious apparent value may be 
created by the use of an inappropriate discount rate. This is particularly important in 
the case of those asset transactions that are effectively financing transactions (for 
example the sale and leaseback of a government property should be evaluated using a 
lower required rate of return than a typical public-sector project, because it generally 
has a very low risk level). 
  For many public projects, sponsors are concerned with the maximization of net 
benefits. In many cases benefits are taken as given and sponsors are concerned only 
with the minimization of costs. If these costs contain a sizeable fixed element, they 
may be somewhat less risky than net benefits. We cannot observe separate market 
prices for the revenue and cost streams of private-sector firms, but it is possible to 
estimate the covariance of changes in these firms’ revenues and costs with changes in 
aggregate accounting profits. These co-variances can be used to derive accounting 
betas’ that serve as proxies for the systematic risks of the revenue and cost streams. 
  The case for using a relatively low discount rate to value a stream of costs 
relies on the fixed nature of many costs. This is distinct from the common 
misconception that, when calculating present values, the adjustment for risk should 
depend on the sign of the cash flow. Stiglitz (1988) argues: “To see how increasing the 
discount rate may lead to absurd results, consider a project that, at termination, requires 
expenditure. Assume that there is some uncertainty about the magnitude of that cost. 
We would normally think that this uncertainty would make that project less attractive 
than if we knew for sure what the termination costs were. But consider what happens if 
we use a higher discount factor to offset the risk: the present value of those costs is 
reduced and the project looks more, not less, attractive”. 
 
7. INVESTMENT AND FINANCING  
  
Another important feature of private-sector investment is that the evaluation of 
an investment should be independent of the financing of the investment. Also, it should 
be independent of the accounting treatment of the investment and its associated 
financing. For example, the fact that the government finances its investments by 
borrowing at a lower rate than the private sector is irrelevant to the evaluation of its 
investments as this low borrowing rate is made possible only by the government’s 
powers of taxation and is unaffected by the projects that it invests in. Similarly a 
government transaction that happens to increase the public-sector borrowing 
requirement should not be treated differently from another transaction that does not 
affect the public-sector borrowing requirement. 
 
8. AN EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION 
 
  We conclude our considerations with an example that highlights some of the 
issues mentioned above. This example is that of general purpose property, such as 
office buildings used by the public sector. The question we want to answer is: Should  
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these be owned and maintained by the public sector or should they be rented? Or: 
Should the public sector’s valuation of these assets be different from their private-
sector valuation? 
  In order to answer this question we consider the various effects that may give 
rise to a difference between public- and private-sector valuations: public goods, 
monopoly power, externalities, risk and taxes. In the absence of any differential effect 
across the two sectors, public-sector valuation should simply follow the best practice in 
private-sector valuation. 
  In the case of general purpose property, such as an office building, it is difficult 
to argue that there are any significant public goods, monopolies, or externalities. 
Agency effects that may result in less-efficient management of the property will be 
reflected in the estimated cash flows from the property. The discount rate used for 
valuation will not be affected by the existence of these effects. In so far as risk is 
concerned, risk sharing should be the same whether the asset is owned by the private 
sector or by the government, as the existence of a claim on a given property will do 
very little to complete the market. This leaves the final issue of taxes. If the public 
sector decides to own the property, rather than lease it, the present value of the lease 
payments thus saved must be compared to the purchase price of the property. This 
calculation should be carried out by discounting pre-tax cash flows at the appropriate 
pre-tax discount rate. In the private sector the relevant calculation involves the 
discounting of after-tax cash flows at the after-tax opportunity cost of capital. As a 
result, the private sector may value the asset more highly than the public sector if the 
private sector can use the asset to reduce taxes. The private sector may therefore be 
willing to pay more for the asset than the public sector by the present value of the tax 
savings it can achieve by owning the asset. This should not necessarily constitute a 
reason for the government to sell the asset to the private sector,  for it is taxpayers who 
will pay for this apparent gain. 
   
9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  In this paper we made a general assessment of public investment, highlighting 
the differences between investment project in public and private- sector. Also, we 
presented the investment criteria within public-sector enterprises with particular 
emphasis on the cost of capital. In particular we argue that: 
  in an open economy the relevant discount rate for government projects is the 
opportunity cost of capital – that is the expected return on comparable 
investments in the capital markets; 
  since the government receives all tax revenues, risk-free projects should be 
valued by discounting their pre-tax cash flows by the pre-tax interest rate; 
  if the pay-offs of the project are spanned by existing traded securities, then the 
risk premium demanded should be the same in both the public and privates 
sectors; the presence of complete capital markets lessens the need for the 
government to diversify on behalf of citizen; 
  the appropriate discount rate for costs is generally substantially lower than for 
net cash flows.  
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